HIS 132 - American History II: Atomic Bomb Debate

Kishimoto analyzes and compares the controversies surrounding World War II atrocities and how the refusal or delivery of apologies was influenced by the World War II discourses in the US and Japan. He opines that the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World Way II demonstrates that there are many events that are ignored and excluded from the official narrative of the war because they are brutal and atrocious. Accounts supporting his contention are discussed.

Bernstein examines the moral issues involved in the use of the atomic bomb on Japan in 1945. If the bomb had been used truly on a military target and not substantially on noncombatants, then possibly only soldiers and military personnel would have been affected.

This paper tries to explain the decision of US Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, and the motivations of dropping the atomic bombs.

every human being - with the exception of two - within a 1.2 kilometer radius of the hypocenter were atomized or fried within a few seconds of the 8:15 a.m. bombing. Civilization is imperiled by: a universal thermonuclear war, catastrophic hunger for most of mankind, stupefaction from the narcotic of "mass culture" and bureaucratized dogmatism, a spreading of mass myths that put entire peoples and continents under power of cruel and treacherous demagogues, and destruction or degeneration from the unforeseeable consequences of life on our planet.

Both military and diplomatic historians have made important contributions to the atomic bomb debate. If nothing else, their incessant analysis of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as well as their graphic depictions of the suffering therein, has helped to steer later generations away from the callous use of atomic weapons. Although many people are offended by those who challenge the validity of Truman's decision, I prefer to see something inherently humane in the work of those searching for nonatomic options. That the two groups differ so widely in conclusions, however, no doubt stems from their markedly divergent perspectives of, approach to, and analysis of the issues.

When Adolf Hitler's Luftwaffe destroyed the Spanish town of Guernica on Apr 26, 1937, more than 1, 650 people were killed and nearly 900 wounded. This slaughter of civilians was broadly condemned in the US and Great Britain. Here, Ross discusses how the US reversed its policy on bombing civilians.

There was no guarantee that the Japanese government would surrender-or that, if it did, the Japanese armed forces would comply with surrender. [...]the chiefs recognized that even if a two-phase initial invasion succeeded, the United States might be faced with the absence of an organized capitulation of Japan's armed forces. Far from moderating the bombing effects on the Japanese population, the shift of target priority from cities to the rail transportation system threatened to produce an immensely greater catastrophe, as it would disrupt the already critical food supply. Since 1944 the American blockade had effectively cut off seaborne food imports, and by 1945 Japan's own food production was collapsing.

As the Cold War winds down, there is renewed interest in the Hiroshima story--and in the profound questions Secretary Stimson and others came to understand were posed by the first use of nuclear weapons, and by the U.S. contribution to the tensions that were to dominate international relations for more than four decades.

This is the story of the most powerful and destructive device ever invented. With newly restored footage, go behind the scenes of the first atomic bomb, revealing how it was developed and how it changed the planet. Examine the choices society has made since 1945--and continues to make--to live with an invention that could destroy the planet. Distributed by PBS Distribution.

The atomic bomb provided a means for obtaining the emotional and political goal of unconditional surrender of Japan. Given all the uncertainties surrounding the termination of total war, it could be argued that the best approach was to end the war as soon as possible on Allied terms.

The article presents a reprint of the article "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb," by Henry L. Stimson which appeared in the February 1947 issue of "Harper's Magazine." It discusses the decision of the United States to use atomic bombs in its attacks on Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. It presents an account on what transpired which led to the event. It also presents the memorandum discussed with US President Harry S. Truman.

[...] even after both atomic bombs, the Japanese War Cabinet remained deadlocked on whether to give up. Instead of storming Japan with guns and grenades and flame throwers, dodging kamikazes, shooting and stabbing and slicing and dicing not only Japanese men but also screaming women-and-children-turned-combatants, George went home -- to peace.

The number of U.S. servicemen who would lose their lives in an invasion of Japan was the overriding concern in deciding to drop the atomic bombs that ended World War II.

"Were we wrong to drop the bomb?" (Arizona Republic) This article presents a debate as to whether the U.S. was justified in dropping atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945.

In retrospect, the August 1945 atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki raised ethical questions about the involvement of civilians and whether there were other ways to end the war. A history professor argues that "before Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the use of the A-bomb did not raise profound moral issues for policymakers" (FOREIGN AFFAIRS). Despite occasional doubts expressed by President Roosevelt and others involved in the Manhattan Project--the code name for the atomic bomb project-- there was never any real question of whether or not the bomb should be used. The ambivalence of President Truman and Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson is described. Details are provided of the decision-making processes that led to the use of the bomb to end the war with Japan.

Almost 50 years after the United States dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, most Americans have little idea how the targets were chosen.

Nor do they realize how close President Truman came to ordering the Air Force to drop a third bomb on Tokyo.